Part 1 Kudakwashe Tagwirei: Business Empire, Controversies, and Networks

Introduction

Kudakwashe Regimond Tagwirei is a Zimbabwean businessman and presidential adviser who has built a sprawling business empire across fuel, mining, agriculture, and finance. Often nicknamed “Queen Bee” for his outsized influence, Tagwirei rose to prominence through close ties to ruling elites – including President Emmerson Mnangagwa and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga – and has been dogged by allegations of state capture and corruption . Since 2017, companies linked to Tagwirei received over $1.6 billion in government contracts and procurement deals, spanning oil supply, power generation, farming programs, and mining ventures . In turn, he has used opaque networks of more than 40 companies (in Zimbabwe and offshore) to hide his wealth and funnel benefits to political allies, sometimes rewarding officials with lavish gifts like expensive cars . Tagwirei’s meteoric rise has made him one of Zimbabwe’s richest men, with an estimated fortune in the hundreds of millions of dollars , even as his business practices have drawn sanctions from the U.S. and U.K. for enriching himself at the expense of the public . The sections below detail Tagwirei’s business empire, the structure and finances of his companies, major deals and scandals, beneficiaries of his patronage, and his current status under sanctions.

The Tagwirei Business Empire and Key Entities

Sakunda Holdings (Fuel & Energy)

Sakunda Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. is the flagship of Tagwirei’s empire, founded in the early 2000s as a fuel trading and distribution company. Based in Harare, Sakunda is privately held by Tagwirei (who owns 54%) and his wife Sandra Mpunga (46%) . Under Tagwirei’s leadership (he is CEO and founding director), Sakunda grew from operating fuel stations to dominating Zimbabwe’s petroleum supply chain . It secured lucrative government contracts – often without open tender – such as importing fuel for the national oil company, running a Command Agriculture farm subsidy program, and building an emergency power plant. From 2017 onward (after President Mnangagwa took office), Sakunda companies received over $1.6 billion in public payments . This included a $630 million contract in 2016 to build the Dema diesel power plant awarded under irregular circumstances; a forensic audit later found the President’s Office intervened to have Sakunda’s unsolicited bid (despite Sakunda’s lack of power-plant experience) accepted outside the standard tender process . Sakunda was also handed the $1 billion Command Agriculture scheme in 2016 as the lead financier and implementer without competitive bidding . These deals, enabled by Tagwirei’s political connections, turned Sakunda into a financial powerhouse – but also sparked accusations that Tagwirei leveraged state coffers and preferential treatment (such as access to hard currency at official rates) for personal gain .

One of Tagwirei’s key partnerships was with global commodities trader Trafigura in the fuel sector. In 2013, Tagwirei struck a deal to give Trafigura a 49% stake in Sakunda Supplies – a joint venture that took over Sakunda’s rights to import fuel via the strategic Beira pipeline from Mozambique . Trafigura provided the capital, fuel cargoes, and expertise, while Tagwirei provided political access and control of the local market . “Trafigura provided everything… [Sakunda’s role] was the political connections to the Reserve Bank and the president. Their aim was to keep profits low in Zimbabwe and pay Tagwirei offshore,” said a former Trafigura Zimbabwe director . Indeed, the JV granted Tagwirei lucrative fees and bonuses: by early 2018 Trafigura had paid him at least $100 million for helping secure their dominant position in Zimbabwe’s fuel market . In exchange, the Trafigura-Sakunda venture (later renamed Trafigura Zimbabwe) received priority access to the pipeline and became the near-monopoly fuel supplier, earning gross profit margins up to 40% on fuel deliveries . Trafigura also advanced over $1 billion in high-interest loans (some at 12–16% interest, guaranteed by Zimbabwe’s central bank) to pre-finance fuel supplies – debts ultimately borne by the public. This opaque arrangement benefitted both Tagwirei and Trafigura for years. Even after Trafigura bought out Tagwirei’s stake in late 2019 (ahead of looming U.S. sanctions), it continued indirectly partnering with his network. Tagwirei had by then shifted operations to offshore vehicles (notably a Mauritian entity) so that fuel deals could carry on with Trafigura behind a “clean” façade despite Tagwirei’s notoriety .

Beyond fuel, Sakunda branched into banking, logistics, and real estate. It acquired stakes in financial institutions and allegedly influenced the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) to obtain scarce U.S. dollars at favorable exchange rates . Sakunda’s close ties to the RBZ were evident during the Command Agriculture program: the company received large Treasury Bill (TB) issuances from the central bank as payment. Parliamentary inquiries later revealed that between 2017 and 2019, Tagwirei’s group was awarded at least $3 billion in TBs, raising questions about the RBZ’s authority and transparency . These quasi-fiscal debts financed Tagwirei’s expansion while contributing to Zimbabwe’s monetary instability. (In one case detailed later, RBZ allowed Sakunda to redeem a TB at an extremely preferential rate, effectively printing money for Tagwirei’s benefit .) By 2020, Sakunda Holdings and its affiliates had become so intertwined with Zimbabwe’s economy and political hierarchy that many observers saw Tagwirei as a linchpin of the country’s patronage system – the “Queen Bee” in a hive of patron-client business dealings .

Landela Mining Ventures (Mining Investments)

In the late 2010s, Tagwirei expanded aggressively into mining through Landela Mining Ventures (Pvt) Ltd. (also referred to as Landela Investments). Landela is a Zimbabwe-registered company, majority-owned by Tagwirei , which served as the vehicle for acquiring mineral assets – often at bargain prices – as part of Zimbabwe’s privatization and revival efforts. Tagwirei installed respected mining executives to lend credibility; Landela’s CEO was David Brown, former chief executive of Impala Platinum in South Africa . Beginning around 2019, Landela went on a buying spree of local mines , using Tagwirei’s access to state financing to snap up gold and platinum assets:

• Gold Mines: In 2019–2020, Landela acquired several idle or distressed gold mines. It purchased the Shamva Gold Mine (with capacity ~21,000 ounces/year) from Metallon Corporation (owned by SA businessman Mzi Khumalo) and quickly restarted operations . Landela also negotiated to buy Mazowe Gold Mine and other Metallon assets . At the same time, Landela reached agreements to take over four idled gold mines from the state-owned Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) . Those four combined had potential output of 85,000 ounces per year . Controlling these gold sites is strategically important, as gold is Zimbabwe’s top export earner – giving Landela privileged access to foreign currency earnings . Notably, these acquisitions were partly funded by opaque financing from the RBZ: investigators found that Landela received hard currency at the official rate by cashing in a $60 million portion of a Treasury Bill that Sakunda held, on the pretext that the funds were needed to buy the Bindura Nickel Corporation (BNC) . This favorable exchange (far below market FX rates) essentially gave Landela subsidized USD to pay for mines – an arbitrage benefiting Tagwirei’s firm at the public’s expense.

• Bindura Nickel Corporation: Landela (through a Mauritius-based affiliate, see Sotic below) bought a controlling stake in BNC – Zimbabwe’s major nickel mine and smelter – from Asa Resource Group in 2020. Asa was a bankrupt UK-listed company, and Tagwirei’s team managed to purchase BNC and the Freda Rebecca Gold Mine for only $29.5 million via an administrator sale . Documents suggest the purchase was structured through Tagwirei’s front company Sotic International and financed by moving funds out of Zimbabwe through suspect means (including false export invoices that do not match any real shipments, raising the possibility of trade-based money laundering) . By underpaying for these assets and using preferential RBZ funds, Landela effectively capitalized on Zimbabwe’s economic turmoil to acquire valuable mines at knock-down prices.

  
  

• Platinum (Great Dyke Investments): In 2019, Landela entered a joint venture in platinum. It partnered with Zimbabwe’s military (via its company Pen East) and Russia’s Vi Holding to form Great Dyke Investments (GDI), which owns the Darwendale platinum deposit. Landela/Tagwirei paid the military’s company an off-book sum (reported figures range widely, from ZWL$46 million up to $220 million) and paid $21.5 million directly to GDI, in order to acquire 50% ownership of GDI . This infusion effectively bought half of a mine worth hundreds of millions, and crucially off-budget funds flowed to the Zimbabwe Defence Forces at a time when the army was under scrutiny for violent crackdowns . GDI’s other 50% was held by the Russian investors. Soon after Landela’s entry, the government granted GDI a 5-year tax holiday on corporate income tax and exempted its (local) shareholders from dividend taxes, retroactive to Jan 2020 – a decision that saved the owners tens of millions and was made after Tagwirei’s company became a shareholder. In early 2020, Tagwirei’s close associate Obey Chimuka (through Fossil Mines – see later section) also bought a 4.4% stake in GDI for $30 million, implying a valuation of ~$680 million for the venture . These maneuvers suggest Tagwirei and partners positioned themselves to profit massively from Zimbabwe’s largest platinum project while the state forewent tax revenue. It also exemplified Tagwirei’s pattern of partnering with security forces and foreign actors in extractive industries.

By mid-2020, Landela had assembled a formidable mining portfolio spanning gold, nickel, and platinum. This expansion was facilitated by close cooperation from the Finance Ministry and central bank – effectively state-backed financing for Tagwirei’s private acquisitions . In exchange, Tagwirei presented himself as rescuing and recapitalizing mines that were moribund. “If we can develop the assets with appropriate capital, this will be a significant business,” Landela’s CEO Brown told Reuters in 2020, referring to the gold mines . Indeed, Landela’s mining assets later formed the core of a new state-linked mining group (Kuvimba Mining House) once Tagwirei’s involvement became contentious (more below). It’s important to note that Landela’s rise was not purely market-driven – it was underwritten by treasury bills and preferential policies. As one investigative report summarized: possibly unlawful payments from the RBZ to Tagwirei’s companies formed up to one-third of the USD $280 million surplus that Sakunda/Tagwirei amassed from Command Agriculture, and some of those funds were used by Tagwirei’s firms to pay for gold mines and the military’s platinum share – in effect, the central bank printed money for private companies to buy public assets . This highlights how Landela’s business model was entwined with government support at the highest levels.

Sotic International (Mauritius) and Offshore Vehicles

Sotic International Ltd. is a Mauritius-registered company that became the linchpin of Tagwirei’s offshore structure. As Tagwirei’s profile in Zimbabwe grew controversial, he and his advisers set up Sotic in 2018–2019 to serve as a “clean” holding company for foreign deals . Sotic was ostensibly independent, but documents and emails uncovered by investigators show it was controlled by Tagwirei behind the scenes . To mask his involvement, Sotic’s directors and proxies included South African businessmen – several of them former Trafigura executives – who fronted for the true owner . A Mauritian management firm, Capital Horizons Ltd. (CHL), administered Sotic and helped set up associated shell companies in friendly jurisdictions . Tagwirei also leveraged relationships to enable Sotic’s banking: when negative press made banks wary, he tapped the CEO of Mauritius’ AfrAsia Bank (with whom he had a prior relationship) to open Sotic accounts in USD and EUR, bypassing normal due diligence .

Through Sotic, Tagwirei executed the purchase of major mining assets from foreign owners. Most notably, in 2020 Sotic (via its Zimbabwean arm, Landela) acquired the Bindura Nickel Corporation and Freda Rebecca Gold Mine from Asa Resource Group’s UK administrators for a combined $29.5 million . This deal was extraordinarily low-priced – BNC is Africa’s only integrated nickel smelter–refinery complex, and Freda Rebecca is one of Zimbabwe’s largest gold producers – but Asa had gone bankrupt amid fraud scandals, allowing Tagwirei’s bid to slip through. The Sentry/Open Secrets investigation into this deal found evidence of dubious financial maneuvers in three stages: (1) Sotic’s subsidiary Landela obtained hard currency at the official rate by redeeming part of a TB (worth $60 million) given to Sakunda, under the guise of needing USD for the nickel mine purchase ; (2) to transfer another £12 million out of Zimbabwe for the second payment, Sotic’s South African directors generated false export invoices (for goods not reflected in Zimbabwe’s customs data), suggesting possible trade misinvoicing to evade capital controls ; and (3) for the final £8.7 million payment, Tagwirei injected funds into Sotic through a Cayman Islands investment fund and other offshore layers, disguising the ultimate source of the money . These steps exemplify how Tagwirei used front companies and offshore façades to move wealth out of Zimbabwe – taking advantage of lax international oversight. Many actors involved (directors, banks, lawyers in Mauritius, South Africa, the UK, and Cayman) either knew or should have suspected Tagwirei was behind Sotic’s transactions . Yet the deals proceeded, enabling Tagwirei to effectively launder public funds into private foreign assets.

When the U.S. sanctioned Tagwirei and Sakunda in August 2020 for corruption, this prompted a rapid reshuffle of asset ownership on paper. Control of the mines held by Sotic was shifted to a new Zimbabwean entity, Kuvimba Mining House, in late 2020 (described below) . By doing so, Tagwirei’s circle aimed to insulate those assets from sanctions and public scrutiny – portraying them as national investments rather than Tagwirei’s private holdings. However, as later investigations showed, the private investors behind Kuvimba were largely Tagwirei’s proxies . Sotic International itself went dormant after transferring its stakes, and Mauritius authorities reportedly investigated CHL (the management company) for possible corporate governance breaches related to Sotic. This illustrates a pattern: when Tagwirei’s entities come under spotlight, he often rearranges ownership across borders (Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Cayman, South Africa) to maintain control while obscuring his involvement. Other known offshore vehicles in Tagwirei’s web include Caladrius Investments Ltd. (Mauritius), several South African companies (e.g. Takutata (Pty) Ltd, Suzako Investments (Pty) Ltd, East Africa Supply and Trading), and at least one Cayman Islands fund used in the BNC/Freda transactions . Collectively, these facilitated the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars through jurisdictions like Mauritius (which provided a friendly corporate haven) and the City of London (where Asa’s assets were sold and funds briefly held by administrators) . The complexity of Tagwirei’s offshore empire led one report to dub it “Shadows and Shell Games,” reflecting how his more than 40 companies were structured to hide beneficial ownership and dodge accountability .

Kuvimba Mining House (Public-Private Mining Conglomerate)

Kuvimba Mining House is a mining group created in 2020 by Zimbabwe’s government, touted as a public-private partnership to revive the mining sector. In reality, Kuvimba was built largely from Tagwirei’s assets – a fact initially concealed from the public. The government announced it owned 65% of Kuvimba, with the remaining 35% held by unspecified “private investors,” insisting that Tagwirei was not involved. However, investigative reporting in 2021 uncovered that the minority shareholders were companies linked to Tagwirei . Notably, a Mauritius entity called Pfimbi Resources (meaning “stash” or “hideout” in Shona) was a key shareholder of Kuvimba via an intermediate company (Ziwa Resources). Pfimbi’s ownership traced back to two trusts – the Kudakwashe Tagwirei Family Trust (benefiting Tagwirei’s family) and another trust with unknown beneficiaries – and both trusts listed a lawyer known to represent Tagwirei as the contact . This structure strongly indicated that Tagwirei secretly held up to 35% of Kuvimba, despite official denials. The Sentry in 2021 reported this finding, suggesting the name Pfimbi was apt for what appeared to be Tagwirei’s hidden stash .

Kuvimba’s asset portfolio came directly from Tagwirei’s/Landela’s acquisitions. It included: gold mines (Freda Rebecca, Shamva, and other formerly ZMDC mines), nickel (Bindura Nickel Corporation), platinum (the Darwendale Great Dyke share), as well as claims in chrome and lithium assets. These are among Zimbabwe’s most valuable mineral operations. The government’s 65% stake in Kuvimba was held via a mix of state entities (possibly ZMDC, a state minerals unit, and a sovereign wealth vehicle), aiming to present Kuvimba as primarily state-owned. In 2022, the Finance Ministry valued Kuvimba at about $1.5 billion in total . However, a controversial transaction in late 2023 dramatically called this valuation into question: Zimbabwe’s new sovereign wealth fund, the Mutapa Investment Fund, decided to buy out Kuvimba’s private 35% shareholders. In April 2024 it was revealed that Mutapa agreed to pay a staggering $1.6 billion for that 35% stake – using a government-issued Treasury Bill (debt) for payment . This implied a tripling of Kuvimba’s value to $4.6 billion, far above prior estimates, and meant that 80% of the fresh $1.9 billion debt raised to capitalize Mutapa was immediately funneled to a few unknown individuals . Given the evidence of Pfimbi/Tagwirei’s stake, it appears Tagwirei’s camp (or whichever beneficiaries stood behind the trusts) would receive this $1.6 billion windfall – effectively cashing out their “secret” ownership at an inflated price, courtesy of Zimbabwean taxpayers. The public debt jumped from $18B to $21B (over 5% of GDP) in a matter of months due in part to this payout . Observers noted that if the goal was to resolve questions over Kuvimba’s true ownership, a far cheaper solution would have been to publish the shareholder records of Kuvimba, Ziwa, and the associated trusts, rather than pay a fortune to buy silence . The lack of transparency (indeed, those company records are mysteriously missing from registries ) means it is “impossible to be certain who the ultimate beneficiaries of the Mutapa payment were” . Nonetheless, well-informed sources indicated Tagwirei was still making key decisions at Kuvimba as late as September 2023, just before the buyout .

In essence, Kuvimba represents a partial nationalization (or re-nationalization) of Tagwirei’s mining empire – but one in which the private holders (likely Tagwirei’s proxies) seem to have profited enormously through the state buyout. The deal has prompted calls for Zimbabwe’s Auditor General and Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee to investigate whether this was a “grossly overvalued” transaction that siphoned public funds to politically connected individuals . It also raises concerns for Zimbabwe’s debt resolution efforts, as international creditors see the government taking on huge new debts seemingly to enrich a crony – undermining confidence in economic governance . Today, on paper, Tagwirei no longer holds an official stake in Kuvimba; it is 100% government-owned via Mutapa. But the $1.6 billion question remains: who exactly was paid, and where did that money go? The scenario exemplifies how Tagwirei’s influence persists – even when he steps out of the limelight, the financial structures he set in motion continue to burden Zimbabwe’s public finances for the benefit of a connected few.

Fossil Group and Affiliate Companies

Alongside his flagship firms, Tagwirei’s network extends to allied companies run by associates and family members. Among the most prominent are entities under the Fossil Group, led by business partner Obey Chimuka. Chimuka is frequently described as Tagwirei’s close associate or front man in various ventures . Companies linked to him include Fossil Agro, Fossil Contracting, and Fossil Mines – involved in agriculture inputs, construction, and mining services respectively. These firms have won large government contracts (for road construction, agricultural supply, etc.) and often work in tandem with Tagwirei’s projects. For example, in the platinum venture Great Dyke Investments, Chimuka’s Fossil Mines bought a 4.4% stake for $30 million in 2020 , effectively partnering in Tagwirei’s Darwendale project. This stake purchase provided GDI with cash and gave Chimuka a seat at the table, implying a tight-knit circle of beneficiaries around Tagwirei.

Fossil Agro was also notably involved in Zimbabwe’s Command Agriculture program, supplying fertilizer and seed – sometimes as a subcontractor or parallel bidder to Sakunda. Both Fossil Agro and Sakunda were named in Command Agriculture disbursements, suggesting coordinated roles. Investigations have pointed out that these related companies create an illusion of multiple players, whereas they ultimately connect back to the same power network. As an example, when Sakunda received a huge Treasury Bill for Command Agriculture and needed to convert part of it to USD, it was Landela (Tagwirei’s subsidiary) and Fossil Agro that worked with RBZ to utilize the funds, ostensibly to procure farming inputs and mining assets . Obey Chimuka himself has faced allegations of acting as Tagwirei’s proxy to hold assets during times of scrutiny – a pattern common in Tagwirei’s strategy of placing assets under loyal associates or relatives to evade direct accountability.

Other notable entities include Sakunda’s many subsidiaries and related firms in Zimbabwe, often with innocuous names: e.g. Sakunda Trading, Sakunda Logistics, Sakunda Energy, Sakunda Properties, Warcor (Warcos) Investments, Pom Pom Investments, etc. . Some of these held specific assets (like fuel depots, real estate, or were used as financing vehicles – Warcos, for instance, financed the construction of Tagwirei’s lavish mansion ). Court testimony in Zimbabwe confirmed that Tagwirei and his wife are the sole beneficial owners of Sakunda Holdings and by extension its various affiliates . This family ownership structure suggests that even if nominal directors or minority shareholders appear (perhaps to satisfy local ownership laws or provide a layer of deniability), ultimate control rests with Tagwirei’s household. Indeed, Tagwirei has reportedly transferred some personal assets to his wife and possibly other family trusts in the face of sanctions – a common tactic to protect wealth.

Furthermore, Tagwirei’s reach includes financial institutions. While not overtly owning banks, he has been linked to influence over major banks like CBZ and ZB Bank through government channels, and he was part of a consortium (with Fossil and others) that at one point sought to invest in or acquire financial services firms. Tagwirei was also involved in the partial privatization of Fidelity Printers & Refiners (Zimbabwe’s gold refinery) in 2021 – it is believed his consortium was behind the private investor that took 40% of Fidelity when it was spun off from the central bank . This would align with an observed trend: Tagwirei and his allies quietly amassing stakes in key pillars of the economy – oil, gold, platinum, agriculture, banking – often behind layers of fronts.

In summary, beyond the headline names (Sakunda, Landela, Sotic, Kuvimba), there exists a web of interlocking companies and allies. Political elites and Tagwirei’s confidants populate this web. For example, John Mangudya (RBZ Governor) was even named as a beneficiary in one of Tagwirei’s trust structures, implying high-level complicity or benefit . Colonel (Retired) Tshinga Dube, a ZANU-PF stalwart, was reported to chair some of Tagwirei’s companies. And Tagwirei’s own relatives (like his wife) and long-time friends serve as directors in various ventures.

In Part 2 we will highlight some of the core companies in Tagwirei’s empire, their registration locales, ownership, and roles.